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CONCLUDING REMARKS
SUSAN J.

STABILE*

Anniversaries are often, and should be, times of reflection.
That is especially true in an area like pensions and employee benefits, which, as Professor Getman and others have suggested, is an
area in the process of change. As we approach the twentieth anniversary of ERISA, there is much to reflect on, both in terms of the
magnitude of what the statute has accomplished and the magnitude of what needs to be improved.
ERISA has given us vesting and benefit accrual rules'
designed to prevent forfeiture of pension benefits (which, as
Michael Sirkin pointed out,2 was one of the driving forces behind
the passage of ERISA) and minimum funding standards designed
to ensure that when employees retire they receive their promised
pension benefit.3 ERISA has imposed high standards of behavior
on fiduciaries of pension plan assets. 4 The statute has also established criteria aimed at insuring that nonhighly compensated employees are not excluded from benefitting from pension arrangements.5 Finally, and by no means least in importance, ERISA is
responsible for instituting a system of termination insurance that
insures that even when employers run into financial difficulties,
there will be funds available to pay at least some amount of pension benefits to employees. 6 For all of that, we should applaud the
lawmakers who enacted ERISA.
Also, as the remarks of several of our panelists have noted,
much has been done since the passage of ERISA to improve the
protections that ERISA put into place. The Supreme Court has
gone far in protecting pension benefits (at least with respect to
benefits under plans subject to the anti-alienation provision of
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code) in the case of individual
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. § 1051-1061 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2 See Michael Sirkin, Twenty Year History of ERISA, 68 ST. JOH's L. REv. 321,

323 (1994).
3 ERISA §§ 301-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4 ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5 I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1992).
6 ERISA § 4047, 29 U.S.C. § 1347 (1988).
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bankruptcy, as Ms. Cullinan Ray's discussion of Pattersonv. Shumate7 makes clear.8 On the investment side, the new SEC proxy
rules 9 have given tremendously increased power and ability to
participate in the proxy process to large institutional investors
such as pension plans. 10 Large pension funds are starting to actively flex their muscles in this regard.
Having said that, there is clearly far more that needs to be
done. Allow me just to mention a few areas.
Possible PBGC reform remains a very important issue.
Despite rules requiring adequate levels of funding, there is now
approximately $51 billion in underfunding of pension plans, which
could carry potential taxpayer liabilities of $13 billion by virtue
of PBGC insurance coverage."' While one may quibble about
whether the comparisons that have been made to the S&L crisis
are warranted, it is hard to disagree with the notion that if something is not done soon, we will be confronting an emergency.
More than one panelist has discussed the administrative complexity and burdensome nature of much of ERISA. 12 The rules
and regulations that we have put into place, designed to help and
prevent plan discrimination (in benefits and coverage) in favor of
highly compensated employees, have become so complex that it is
not clear anyone benefits from them, except lawyers who bill endless hours in revising plans to comply with the rules and in attempting to explain the changes to their clients. Compliance is so
costly and the rules so difficult to wade through that, rather than
improving things for lower compensated employees, there is evidence that a number of employers are shying away from adopting
new defined-benefit pension plans and shifting away from definedbenefit plans to defined-contribution plans. Furthermore, as Mr.
Bidjarano illustrated,' 3 other employers just spend more energy
7 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
8 See Jeanne Cullinan Ray, ProtectingPensionAssets in PersonalBankruptcy, 68
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 409, 412-417 (1994).
9 Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
34-31326, 1992 LEXIS 2470 (Oct. 16, 1992); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1992).
10 See David George Ball, Revolution in the Board Room, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
329 (1994).
11 Pension Reform Will Follow Health Reform, Rostenkowski Says, 20 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 40, at 2175 (Oct. 11, 1993).
12 E.g., Barry Bidjarano, Coping with the Reduced Limitation on "Compensation"
Used Under Qualified Retirement Plans, 68 ST. JoHN's L. Ruv. 357 (1994).
13 Id.
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coming up with crafty ways to get their highly compensated employees exactly the benefit they want them to get.
ERISA was passed with a broad preemption provision
designed to prevent states from interfering with the protections
afforded by the federal statute. 1 4 Yet not only are interpretations
of the preemption provision all over the lot, causing tremendous
confusion about what the outer limits of preemption are, but many
state attempts to protect plan beneficiaries generally and to make
improvements particularly in the area of medical care have been
frustrated. This symposium dealt with two particular examples of
preemption difficulties. As Representative Engel discussed,'15 the
exception from ERISA preemption for state insurance law1 6 has
the strange result that state insurance law is able to regulate, to
some degree, insured medical plans, whereas there is no regulation-federal or state-of self-insured plans. As was also revealed, there are situations where the preemption provision results in no state remedy for a wrong, even where no remedy is
provided by ERISA.
Finally, ERISA imposes the highest of standards on the behavior of pension plan fiduciaries, charging them with acting
solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries and
prohibiting them from self-dealing and from permitting a variety
of transactions between plans and parties and interests to those
plans. Yet the Mertens v. Hewitt1 7 case, decided by the Supreme
Court during the summer of 1993, bars the recovery of money
damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach. Dictum in that decision suggests that there may
be no liability at all under the statute against parties who are not
fiduciaries to pension plans. At least one circuit court has so de8
cided in the wake of Mertens.'
All of these are problems that require some Congressional action to address. None of them can be solved simply by statutory
interpretation. Consider the four areas just mentioned as requiring some reform.
With respect to plan underfunding, the length of time employers are given by statute to amortize liabilities created by giving
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
15 Eliot L. Engel, Remarks, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 343, 346-47 (1994).
16 § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
17 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
18 See Schloegel v. Boswell, 994 F.2d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 1993).
14
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past service credit' 9 (in the case of a new plan) and by amendments to increase benefits or by shortfalls resulting from changes
in actuarial assumptions2 ° (in the case of an existing plan) contributes to underfunding, as do waivers from applicable funding
rules that the statute allows to be granted. 2 '
The nondiscrimination rules speak for themselves. Statutory
and regulatory interpretation probably could not make the matter
any worse, but certainly will not help.
With respect to preemption, no amount of statutory interpretation can fix the fundamental problem of the way section 514 of
ERISA is drafted. Wherever one falls in terms of the alternatives
for reform that were discussed-whether one favors content based
preemption or reform of particular issues-something must be
done to the "relate to" standard for preemption.
Finally, although I have had heated arguments with one of
my former colleagues at Cleary, Gottlieb on this subject, the better
side of the argument is that Mertens in its dicta is correct as a
matter of statutory interpretation. That is, the remedies set out
in the statute are the exclusive ones and the statute on its face
provides no cause of action against nonfiduciaries. Yet, it will not
always be possible to adequately compensate a plan for its losses
without holding a nonfiduciary who participated in the breach to
account.2 2
There is some indication, certainly, that reform in certain areas will be forthcoming. Although we are unlikely to see any real
pension reform until after the medical care bill is behind us, there
is clearly significant support for pension reform. Such reforms
may not solve all of the problems in ERISA, but real improvement
may be upon us soon. It will be interesting to see how far we have
come when we reconvene to celebrate another ERISA anniversary.

19 See 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (1985).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 This is especially true if the dissent

in Mertens is correctly reasoned that State
law actions against nonfiduciaries are preempted by ERISA. See 113 S. Ct. at 2079
n.2 (White, J., dissenting).

